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Abstract
Radzik (1991) showed that, by strengthening the usual quasi-concavity as-
sumption on players’ payoff functions, upper semi-continuous two-player games
on compact intervals of the real line have ε-equilibria for all ε > 0. Ziad (1997)
then stated that the same conclusion holds for n-player games on compact,
convex subsets of Rm, m ≥ 1, provided that the upper semi-continuity con-
dition is strengthened. Both Radzik’s and Ziad’s proofs rely crucially on the
lower hemi-continuity of the ε-best reply correspondence. We show that: (1)
in contrast to what is stated by Ziad, his conditions fail to be sufficient for
the lower hemi-continuity of the approximate best-reply correspondence, (2)
the approximate best-reply correspondence is indeed lower hemi-continuous if
players’ action spaces are polytopes, and (3) with action spaces as polytopes,
Ziad’s theorem can be stated so that it properly generalizes Radzik’s theorem.
∗I wish to thank Erik Balder, Paulo Ba´rcia, Paulo Coˆrte-Real, Branko Gru¨nbaun, Gil Kalai,
Armando Machado, Lu´ıs Vasconcelos and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments. Special
thanks are due to an associate editor, whose comments greatly improved the paper. I thank also
John Huffstot for editorial assistance. Any remaining error is, of course, my own.
†Address: Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia, Campus de Campolide, 1099-
032 Lisboa, Portugal; Phone: (351) 21 380 1672; Fax: (351) 21 387 0933; email: gcarmona@fe.unl.pt.
1
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72.
Keywords : Discontinuous games, upper semi-continuity, lower semi-continuity,
quasi-concavity, approximate equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Classic existence results (e.g., Nash (1950)) show that a normal-form game has a Nash
equilibrium provided that two sets of conditions hold. First, each player’s action space
is a non-empty, compact, convex subset of a euclidean space. Second, each player’s
payoff function is jointly continuous and separately quasi-concave in his own action.
The goal of this note is to show that, for the existence of approximate equilibria
in normal-form games with polytopes as action spaces, the continuity requirement
on players’ payoff functions can be weakened from joint continuity to joint upper
semi-continuity by strengthening the quasi-concavity requirement.
Our results build upon those of Radzik (1991) and Ziad (1997). In order to explain
our results and how they relate to theirs, we briefly recall some game-theoretical and
mathematical notions (Definitions 1 and 2, respectively).
Definition 1 1. A normal form game G consists of a finite set of players N =
{1, . . . , n}, and, for all players i ∈ N, a pure strategy set Xi, which is a non-
empty compact subset of Rm, and a bounded payoff function ui : X → R, where
X = ×i∈NXi.
2. The symbol −i denotes “all players but i.” In particular, X−i = ×j 6=iXj. The
value function of player i is Vi : X−i → R defined by Vi(x−i) = supxi∈Xi ui(xi, x−i).
3. Given a game G and ε ≥ 0, an ε-equilibrium of G is x∗ ∈ X such that ui(x∗) ≥
ui(xi, x
∗
−i) − ε for all i ∈ N and xi ∈ Xi. A Nash equilibrium of G is an
ε-equilibrium for ε = 0.
4. For all ε > 0 and i ∈ N , the player i’s ε-best-reply correspondence is BRεi :
X−i ⇒ Xi defined by BRεi (x−i) = cl({xi ∈ Xi : ui(xi, x−i) > supxˆi∈Xi ui(xˆi, x−i)−
2
ε}) for all x−i ∈ X−i.1 The ε-best-reply correspondence is BRε : X ⇒ X de-
fined by BRε(x) = BR
ε
1(x−1)× · · · ×BRεn(x−n) for all x ∈ X.
Definition 2 Let X and Y be compact and convex subsets of a euclidean space.
1. A polytope is the convex hull of finitely many points.
2. For a function f : X → R, an upper set is of the form {x ∈ X : f(x) ≥ a} for
some a ∈ R.
3. A function is upper semi-continuous if all its upper sets are closed, quasi-
concave if all its upper sets are convex, and polyhedral quasi-concave if all
its upper sets are polytopes.
4. For a function f : X × Y → R, these notions apply jointly to the argument
(x, y) of f(x, y). Separate upper semi-continuity, quasi-concavity and polyhedral
quasi-concavity in x, say, apply to f(x, y) as a function of x.
5. A correspondence β : X ⇒ Y is closed-valued if β(x) is closed for all x ∈ X.
It is lower hemi-continuous if the set {x ∈ X : β(x) ⊆ F} is closed for each
closed subset F of Y . A closed-valued correspondence is upper hemi-continuous
if its graph is closed.
6. A point x ∈ X is a fixed point of β if x ∈ β(x). A function f : X → Y is a
continuous selection of β if f is continuous and f(x) ∈ β(x) for all x ∈ X.
Recall, as well, that if β : X ⇒ X is such that β(x) is nonempty, compact and
convex for all x ∈ X and X if finite-dimensional and compact, then: (1) If β is upper
hemi-continuous, by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem there is a fixed point x of β. (2)
If β is lower hemi-continuous, then Michael’s selection theorem implies that there is
a continuous selection f of β.
Radzik (1991) considers payoff functions that are jointly upper semi-continuous
and separately quasi-concave in each player’s own action. Radzik considers only
two players, each with an interval as strategy set. He shows that these assumptions
1For all subsets A of a topological space Y , cl(A) denotes the closure of A.
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are not enough to guarantee the existence of an ε-equilibrium for all ε > 0. A
solution to this existence problem can be obtained by strengthening upper semi-
continuity to continuity since this would imply the existence of a Nash equilibrium
using Kakutani’s theorem. Radzik obtained an alternative solution by strengthening
separate quasi-concavity to the following notion of piecewise quasi-concavity : For
player 1, the compact interval X2 that is the strategy set of player 2 is suitably
covered by a finite number of intervals [bi, bi+1] so that player 1’s payoff function u1 is
jointly quasi-concave on X1× [bi, bi+1] for all i (piecewise quasi-concavity of player 2’s
payoff function is defined analogously).2 His main result shows that if each player’s
payoff function is jointly upper semi-continuous and piecewise quasi-concave, then
the game has an ε-equilibrium for all ε > 0.
Radzik proves his result by establishing that the ε-best reply correspondence is
lower hemi-continuous, with nonempty, compact and convex values. Michael’s selec-
tion theorem then implies that ε-best reply correspondence has a continuous selection,
to which we can apply Brouwer’s fixed point theorem to obtain an ε-equilibrium.
Ziad (1997) also considers the existence of approximate equilibrium in normal-
form games. His setting is more general than that of Radzik (1991) since it allows for
n players (not just two) and nonempty, convex, compact subsets of euclidean spaces
as strategy spaces (not just compact intervals on the real line). He also extends the
notion of piecewise quasi-concavity to this more general setting as follows: The finite
cover of X−i by closed intervals is generalized to a finite cover by convex compact
sets X l−i, so that ui is jointly quasi-concave on Xi ×X l−i. For ease of reference, this
notion is presented in the following definition.
Definition 3 Player i’s payoff function is piecewise quasi-concave if there is a finite
cover of X−i by compact convex subsets X l−i such that ui is quasi-concave on Xi×X l−i
for all l.3
2Radzik has named this property strong quasi-concavity. While the property is a strengthening
of separate quasi-concavity in each player’s own action, the term strong quasi-concavity suggests
that it is a strengthening of joint quasi-concavity, which it is not. For this reason, we refer to it as
piecewise quasi-concavity.
3When n = 2 and players’ action spaces are intervals in R, this definition collapses into Radzik’s
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He then claims, as his main result, that the game has an ε-equilibrium for all ε > 0
if each player’s payoff function ui is upper semi-continuous, piecewise quasi-concave
and if it satisfies an additional property called i-upper semi-continuity. Definition 4
presents its definition, which will be discussed below.
Definition 4 Player i’s payoff function is i-upper semi-continuous if
lim sup
k
Vi(αkz
k
−i + (1− αk)x−i) ≤ lim sup
k
Vi(z
k
−i) (1)
for all x−i ∈ X−i, {zk−i}∞k=1 converging to x−i and {αk}∞k=1 ⊆ (0, 1] converging to zero.
Our contributions to the problem of existence of approximate equilibrium in
normal-form games are the following: First, to note the following mistake in Ziad’s
paper: while he claims that the ε-best reply correspondence is upper hemi-continuous,
his argument in the proof of the theorem attempts, in effect, to show that such a cor-
respondence is lower hemi-continuous. Consequently, Ziad’s argument would need
Michael’s selection theorem rather than Kakutani’s fixed point theorem (as was the
case in Radzik (1991)).
Second, we show that, under Ziad’s assumptions, the ε-best reply correspondence
may however fail to be lower hemi-continuous and to have a continuous selection.
This implies that Ziad’s argument does not prove the existence result he claims.
Third, we show that in Ziad’s framework the ε-best reply correspondence is indeed
lower hemi-continuous if players’ action spaces are polytopes. This implies that Ziad’s
existence theorem is valid for games with polytopes as action spaces.
Fourth, we show that this modified version of Ziad’s result (with polytopes as
action spaces) implies Radzik’s result. Recall that those two results differ because
Ziad’s result requires an additional condition on players’ payoff functions (i-upper
semi-continuity, Definition 4 above) while it allows for more than two players and for
more general action spaces. We show that under Radzik’s assumptions, players’ payoff
functions are i-upper semi-continuous, which immediately implies that Radzik’s result
follows from that of Ziad.
notion of piecewise quasi-concavity.
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Fifth, we show that i-upper semi-continuity is implied by the following requirement
on players’ value functions:
Definition 5 Player i’s value function is piecewise polyhedral quasi-concave if there
is a finite cover of X−i by compact convex subsets X l−i such that Vi is polyhedral quasi-
concave on X l−i for all l.
That is, we show that if player i’s value function is piecewise polyhedral quasi-concave,
then his value function is i-upper semi-continuous.4 Furthermore, we show that, in
Radzik’s setting each player’s value function is piecewise polyhedral quasi-concave.
Thus, the sufficiency of the piecewise polyhedral quasi-concavity of Vi for the i-upper
semi-continuity of ui allows us to state an existence result for approximate equilibria
of n-person games that simultaneously dispenses with the lower semi-continuity of ui
altogether and generalizes Radzik’s theorem.
Proposition 6 Let G be an n-player game such that for all i ∈ N , (1) Xi is a
polytope, (2) ui is upper semi-continuous and piecewise quasi-concave (Definitions 2
and 3), and (3) Vi is piecewise polyhedral quasi-concave (Definition 5). Then, G has
an ε-equilibrium for all ε > 0.
In conclusion, in order to obtain the existence of an approximate equilibrium,
the continuity of players’ payoff function can be weakened to upper semi-continuity.
This is the case when players’ action spaces are polytopes and when players’ payoff
and value functions satisfy a form of quasi-concavity stronger than separate quasi-
concavity in each player’s own action. The usefulness of Proposition 6 therefore lies in
games whose players’ payoff functions do not satisfy any form of lower semi-continuity,
but which are, in compensation, upper semi-continuous and satisfy a relatively strong
4Clearly, i-upper semi-continuity is implied by the continuity of Vi and so can be thought of as
a weak form of continuity. Note, however, that i-upper semi-continuity is neither implied nor does
it imply upper semi-continuity. Indeed, player 2’s payoff function in Example 11 below is upper
semi-continuous but not i-upper semi-continuous. Conversely, if X1 = X2 = [0, 1] and u1 is defined
by u1(x1, x2) = 1 if x1 ≤ 1/2 and u1(x1, x2) = 2 if x1 > 1/2, then u1 is i-upper semi-continuous but
not upper semi-continuous.
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form of quasi-concavity. In contrast, if players’ payoff functions are discontinuous and
separately quasi-concave in each player’s own action but satisfy no stronger quasi-
concave property, then one has to rely on the results of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)
and Reny (1999) to establish the existence of equilibria.
Finally, we note that Proposition 6 is related to Theorem 2 of Gale, Klee, and
Rockafellar (1968), which, in particular, states that, for all closed convex subsets D
of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space, every convex function on D is upper semi-
continuous if and only if the intersection of D with any polytope is a polytope. This
result implies that every concave function on a polytope is lower semi-continuous.5
This, in turn, implies the following existence result: If G is an n-player game such
that for all i ∈ N , (1) Xi is a polytope, (2) ui is upper semi-continuous and (3) there
exists a finite cover of X−i by polytopes X l−i such that ui is concave on Xi × X l−i
for all l, then G has a Nash equilibrium. In fact, by their Theorem 2, ui would be
lower semi-continuous on Xi × X l−i for all l, and so on X = Xi × X−i. Together
with the upper semi-continuity of ui, this implies that ui is actually continuous and
the existence of equilibrium follows from Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. Thus,
in comparison, Proposition 6 allows for compact convex partitions of X−i and it
requires only quasi-concavity of ui on Xi ×X l−i but it only guarantees the existence
of approximate equilibrium and it requires Vi to be polyhedral quasi-concave on X
l
−i.
More importantly, Proposition 6 allows for discontinuous payoff functions whereas the
above existence result applies only to payoff functions that are, in effect, continuous.
5Indeed, if D is a polytope, then D is convex and closed and its intersection with a polytope
is also a polytope. Furthermore, if f : D → R is concave, then −f is convex. Thus, Theorem 2
of Gale, Klee, and Rockafellar (1968) implies that −f is upper semi-continuous and so f is lower
semi-continuous.
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2 Characterizations of Polytopes and Ziad’s The-
orem
We start by stating that Ziad’s theorem is valid when players’ action spaces are
polytopes.
Theorem 7 (Ziad) Let G be an n-player game such that for all i ∈ N , (1) Xi is a
polytope and (2) ui is upper semi-continuous, i-upper semi-continuous and piecewise
quasi-concave. Then for each ε > 0, each player’s ε-best reply correspondence is lower
hemi-continuous. Consequently, G has an ε-equilibrium for all ε > 0.
The reason why polytopes are important for Ziad’s theorem is given in Lemma 9,
which is a simple consequence of the characterization of polytopes that we provide in
Proposition 8. The importance of Lemma 9 is that it allows us to establish the lower
hemi-continuity of the ε-best reply correspondence (which, as explained in the intro-
duction, implies the existence of an ε-equilibrium together with Michael’s selection
theorem and Brouwer’s fixed point theorem).
We start by providing two characterizations of polytopes.
Proposition 8 Let P ⊆ Rn. Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
1. P is a polytope;
2. P is compact, convex and satisfies the following property: for all x ∈ P , there
exists r > 0 such that for all x˜ ∈ P , x˜ 6= x,
x+ r
x˜− x
||x˜− x|| ∈ P ;
3. P is compact, convex and all its extreme points are isolated.
The last condition in property 2 says that the ball of radius r intersected with the
cone of all interior directions from x is a subset of P .6
6I am thankful to an associate editor for this interpretation and for the present proof of Propo-
sition 8.
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Proof of Proposition 8. We will prove that 1 implies 2, 2 implies 3 and 3
implies 1. For convenience, let E(C) denote the set of extreme points of a convex set
C.
Property 2 implies 3 because if there were a sequence {xk}∞k=1 of extreme points of
P converging to x, its elements would eventually be in an r/2-ball around x, but then
its elements would not be extreme: defining x′ = x+2(xk− x), then xk = (x′+ x)/2,
a contradiction since x′ belongs to P . Indeed, x+r(xk−x)/||xk−x|| ∈ P by property
2 and x′ = θ(x+ r(xk − x)/||xk − x||) + (1− θ)x with θ = 2||xk − x||/r ∈ (0, 1).
Property 3 implies 1 because P is equal to the convex hull of its extreme points
and E(P ) is finite. Indeed, E(P ) is closed (see Rockafellar (1970, Corollary 18.1.1))
and clearly bounded; so, if it were to be infinite, then it would have an accumulation
point, a contradiction to property 3.
In order to establish that property 1 implies 2, note that polyhedra (and so poly-
topes) are intersections of finitely many half-spaces. Let P = ∩i∈F{z ∈ Rn : ci·z ≤ di}
for some finite set F , vectors ci ∈ Rn and scalars di ∈ R. Let T = {i ∈ F : ci ·x = di}
and T c = F \ T . Take r to be the smallest distance of x from the hyperplanes
Hi = {z ∈ Rn : ci · z = di} for all i ∈ T c, unless T c = ∅, in which case we can take
r = 1. Let x˜ ∈ P and define x¯ = x + r(x˜ − x)/||x˜ − x||. We claim that ci · x¯ ≤ di
holds for all i ∈ F , which clearly implies that x¯ ∈ P . For convenience, for all i ∈ F ,
let Si = {z ∈ Rn : ci · z ≤ di} and d(x,Hi) = infz∈Hi ||z − x|| denote the distance
of x from Hi. In the case i ∈ T , we have that ci · x = di and ci · x˜ ≤ di and so
ci · x¯ = di + r(ci · x˜ − di)/||x˜ − x|| ≤ di + 0 = di. In the case i ∈ T c, note that
||x¯ − x|| = r ≤ d(x,Hi), which implies that x¯ ∈ Si. In fact, if x¯ 6∈ Si, then define
θ = (di−ci ·x)/(ci · x¯−ci ·x) ∈ (0, 1) (since 0 < di−ci ·x < ci · x¯−ci ·x) and note that
θx¯+(1−θ)x ∈ Hi. But then we obtain that ||θx¯+(1−θ)x−x|| = θr < r ≤ d(x,Hi),
a contradiction.
The following lemma is a simple consequence of Proposition 8 and is key to the
proof of Theorem 7.
Lemma 9 Let P be a polytope, x ∈ P , {xk}∞k=1 and {αk}∞k=1 be such that limk xk = x,
0 < αk ≤ 1 and αkxk + (1 − αk)x ∈ P for all k ∈ N. Then, there exist sequences
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{xˆk}∞k=1 and {θk}∞k=1 such that limk θk = 0, xˆk ∈ P , θk ∈ (0, 1) and xk = θkxˆk + (1−
θk)x for all k sufficiently large. Furthermore, if {αk}∞k=1 is bounded away from zero,
then {xˆk}∞k=1 and {θk}∞k=1 can be chosen so that limk xˆk = x.
The following two special cases illustrate the usefulness of Lemma 9. The first
case (to be considered in the proof of Theorem 7 below) is obtained by letting αk = 1
for all k. Thus, in this case, we have a sequence {xk}∞k=1 contained in the polytope
P , converging to a point x also in P . Lemma 9 then asserts that, for all k sufficiently
large, each xk can be expressed as a convex combination between the limit point x
and some other point xˆk in P .
A second special case of interest (to be considered in the proof of Proposition 12
below) occurs when αk converges to zero. In this case, we have a sequence {xk}∞k=1
converging to a point x in P with the property that αkxk + (1 − αk)x also belongs
to P . Lemma 9 implies that xk must itself belong to P for all k sufficiently large:
In fact, for all k sufficiently large, each xk can be expressed as a convex combination
between the limit point x and some other point xˆk in P .
Proof of Lemma 9. Note first that whenever xk = x we can let xˆk = x and
θk = 1/k. Thus, we may assume that xk 6= x for all k ∈ N.
Let r > 0 be such that x + r(x˜ − x)/||x˜ − x|| ∈ P for all x˜ ∈ P , x˜ 6= x. For
convenience, let x¯k = αkxk + (1 − αk)x for all k. Note that there exists K ∈ N
such that ||xk − x|| < r for all k ≥ K. For all k, define γk = ||x¯k − x||/r and
xˆk = (1/γk)x¯k + (1 − 1/γk)x = x + r(x¯k − x)/||x¯k − x||. Clearly, xˆk ∈ P for all k.
Then, x¯k = γkxˆk + (1− γk)x and so xk = (γk/αk)xˆk + (1− γk/αk)x for all k.
Thus, define θk = γk/αk for all k, which immediately implies that xk = θkxˆk +
(1 − θk)x for all k. Furthermore, θk = ||x¯k − x||/rαk = ||xk − x||/r ∈ (0, 1) for all
k ≥ K and so limk θk = 0.
Finally, consider the case where {αk}∞k=1 is bounded away from zero. In this case,
let K ∈ N be such that ||x¯k − x||1/2 < min{r, 1} for all k ≥ K. For all k, define
γk = ||x¯k − x||1/2 and, as before, xˆk = (1/γk)x¯k + (1 − 1/γk)x and θk = γk/αk.
Clearly, θk > 0 for all k and limk θk = 0, implying that θk ∈ (0, 1) for sufficiently large
k.
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Note that ||xˆk − x|| = ||x¯k − x||/γk = ||x¯k − x||1/2 and so limk xˆk = x. It remains
to show that xˆk ∈ P for all k ≥ K. Since ||x¯k − x||1/2 ≤ r, then 1/||x¯k − x||1/2 ≤
r/||x¯k−x||, which implies that xˆk can be expressed as a convex combination of x and
x+ r(x¯k − x)/||x¯k − x||. Since the latter point belongs to P , then xˆk also belongs to
P .
Lemma 9, together with Ziad’s original argument, allows us to prove Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 7. Let i ∈ N and let βi : X−i ⇒ Xi be defined by
βi(x−i) = {xi ∈ Xi : ui(xi, x−i) > Vi(x−i)− ε}. Note that BRεi (x−i) = cl(βi(x−i)) for
all x−i ∈ X−i. Furthermore, it follows by Aliprantis and Border (1999, Lemma 16.22,
p. 535), that BRεi is lower hemi-continuous if and only if βi is lower hemi-continuous.
In order to establish that βi is lower hemi-continuous, let F ⊆ Xi be closed,
x−i ∈ X−i, {xk−i}∞k=1 ⊆ {x′−i ∈ X−i : βi(x′−i) ⊆ F} be such that limk xk−i = x−i and
xi ∈ βi(x−i). We will show that xi ∈ F , which implies that βi(x−i) ⊆ F .
Let 0 < η < ε be such that ui(xi, x−i) > Vi(x−i) − ε + η. Since ui is upper
semi-continuous, so is Vi. Thus, let δ > 0 be such that Vi(x
′
−i) < Vi(x−i) + η/2 for
all x′−i ∈ X−i satisfying ||x−i − x′−i|| < δ. By Lemma 9 (with αk = 1 for all k), let
{xˆk−i}∞k=1 and {θk}∞k=1 be such that limk xˆk−i = x, limk αk = 0, xˆk−i ∈ Xi, θk ∈ (0, 1)
and xk−i = θkxˆ
k
−i + (1 − θk)x−i for all k sufficiently large. Taking a subsequence if
necessary, we may assume that {Vi(xˆk−i)}∞k=1 converges to lim supk Vi(xˆk−i) and that
xˆk−i ∈ Xi, θk ∈ (0, 1) and xk−i = θkxˆk−i + (1− θk)x−i for all k ∈ N.
Let xˆki ∈ Xi be such that ui(xˆki , xˆk−i) > Vi(xˆk−i)− ε + η/2 and define xki = θkxˆki +
(1− θk)xi for all k. Since limk θk = 0, it follows that limk xki = xi.
We claim that xki ∈ βi(xk−i) for all k sufficiently large. Suppose, in order to reach
a contradiction, that there exists an infinite sequence {kj}j∈N such that ui(xkji , xkj−i) ≤
Vi(x
kj
−i)− ε. Taking a further subsequence if needed, we may assume that there exists
l ∈ {1, . . . , Li} such that xˆkj−i ∈ X l−i for all j. Since X l−i is compact, then x−i ∈ X li .
Thus, the quasi-concavity of ui in Xi ×X l−i implies that
ui(x
kj
i , x
kj
−i) ≥ min{ui(xi, x−i), ui(xˆkji , xˆkj−i)}
> min{Vi(x−i)− ε+ η, Vi(xˆkj−i)− ε+ η/2} = Vi(xˆkj−i)− ε+ η/2,
(2)
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for all j such that ||xˆkj−i−x−i|| < δ (since in this case, Vi(xˆkj−i) < Vi(x−i)+η/2). Hence,
Vi(xˆ
kj
−i) + η/2 < Vi(x
kj
−i) for all j sufficiently large, and so
lim sup
k
Vi(xˆ
k
−i) +
η
2
= lim
j
Vi(xˆ
kj
−i) +
η
2
≤ lim sup
j
Vi(x
kj
−i) ≤ lim sup
k
Vi(x
k
−i), (3)
contradicting the i-upper semi-continuity of ui. This contradiction establishes that
xki ∈ βi(xk−i) for all k sufficiently large. Since βi(xk−i) ⊆ F for all k and F is closed,
then xi = limk x
k
i ∈ F , as desired. Thus, βi, and so BRεi , is lower hemi-continuous.
It is clear that BRεi (x−i) is nonempty, closed and convex. Therefore, BRε(x) =
BRε1(x−1) × · · · × BRεn(x−n) is also nonempty, closed and convex. Furthermore,
BRε : X ⇒ X is lower hemi-continuous. Thus, by Michael’s selection theorem, there
exists a continuous selection f of BRε. Hence, by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, f
has a fixed point x and x is an ε-equilibrium of G.
We note that the only difference between the statement of Theorem 7 and the
original statement in Ziad (1997) is that players’ action spaces are now required to be
polytopes (and not just a convex and compact subset of a euclidean space). As the
following example shows, requiring the action spaces to be convex and compact is not
sufficient to guarantee the lower hemi-continuity of the ε-best reply correspondence.
Example 10 Let G = (X1, X2, u1, u2) be the following 2-player game. Let
X1 = {(x, y) ∈ R2 : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and (1− x)2 ≤ y ≤ 1− x} (4)
and X2 = [0, 1]. We denote x1 = (x, y) and x2 = z.
Let player 1’s payoff function u1 be defined by u1(x, y, z) = 0 for all (x, y, z) ∈ X1×
X2. We define player 2’s payoff function as follows. Define A = X1×{0} ⊆ X1×X2,
B = {(1, 0, 1)} ⊆ X1 ×X2 and C = co(A ∪B). The payoff function for player 2 is
u2(x, y, z) =

2 if (x, y, z) ∈ B,
1 if (x, y, z) ∈ C \B,
0 otherwise.
(5)
Note that X1 = {(x, y) ∈ R2 : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and f(x) ≤ y ≤ 1−x}, where f : R→ R
is defined by f(x) = (1− x)2. Since f is strictly convex and continuous, X1 is convex
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and compact. Clearly, X2 is also compact and convex. Note that u2 is quasi-concave
on X1 × X2. Furthermore, A ∪ B, hence co(A ∪ B), is compact, and so u2 is upper
semi-continuous. Clearly, u1 is both upper semi-continuous and quasi-concave.
We claim that ui is also i-upper semi-continuous for all i. It is clear that V1(z) = 0
for all z ∈ X2 and V2(x, y) = 1 for all (x, y) ∈ X1, except when (x, y) = (1, 0), in which
case V2 equals 2. Condition (1) is trivially satisfied for player 1 and one can easily
show that V2 also satisfies it. To see this, let (x, y) ∈ X1, {(xk, yk)}∞k=1 converging to
(x, y) and {αk}∞k=1 ⊆ (0, 1] converging to zero. If (x, y) 6= (1, 0), we readily obtain that
lim supk V2(αk(xk, yk)+(1−αk)(x, y)) = lim supk V2(xk, yk) = 1. If (x, y) = (1, 0), the
fact that lim supk V2(xk, yk) ≥ 1 implies that it is enough to consider the case when
lim supk V2(αk(xk, yk)+ (1−αk)(x, y)) = 2. However, this condition holds if and only
if there exists a subsequence {(xkj , ykj)}∞j=1 such that (xkj , ykj) = (1, 0). But, clearly,
in this case we also have lim supk V2(xk, yk) = 2. Thus, it follows that V2 satisfies
condition (1) and so u2 is i-upper semi-continuous.
Let 0 < ε < 1. Then, BRε1(z) = X1 for all z ∈ X2 and
BRε2(x, y) =
 {1} if (x, y) = (1, 0),{z ∈ [0, 1] : (x, y, z) ∈ C} otherwise, (6)
for all (x, y) ∈ X1. Clearly, if g : X1 → X2 is a selection from BRε2, then g(x, (1 −
x)2) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1), while g(1, 0) = 1. Hence, it follows that BRε2 has no
continuous selection. Since BRε2(x, y) is nonempty, convex and compact for all (x, y) ∈
X1, it follows by Michael’s selection theorem that BR
ε
2 is not lower hemi-continuous.
Before we conclude this section, we note that the above example can be easily
modified to show that, even when action spaces are polytopes, the ε-best reply cor-
respondence may fail to be lower hemi-continuous if players’ payoff functions are not
i-upper semi-continuous:
Example 11 Let G = (X1, X2, u1, u2) be as in Example 10 except that X1 = {(x, y) ∈
[0, 1] × [0, 1] : y ≤ 1 − x} and both u1 and u2 are extended by defining u1(x, y, z) =
u2(x, y, z) = 0 for all (x, y, z) ∈ X1 ×X2 such that y < (1− x)2.
Clearly, both payoff functions are quasi-concave and upper semi-continuous. The
same argument used above shows that BRε2 is neither lower hemi-continuous nor
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does it have a continuous selection for all 0 < ε < 1. Finally, note that u2 is not
i-upper semi-continuous. Letting (x, y) = (1, 0), (xk, yk) = (1 − 1/k, 1/2k2) and
αk = 1/2k for all k ∈ N, we obtain that yk < f(xk) (recall that f(x) = (1 − x)2),
αkyk + (1 − αk)0 = 1/4k3 ≥ f(1 − 1/2k2) = f(αkxk + (1 − αk)1) for all k and so
lim supk Vi(αk(xk, yk) + (1− αk)(1, 0)) = 1 > 0 = lim supk Vi(xk, yk).
3 Relationship between Radzik’s and Ziad’s The-
orems
As we have shown in the previous section, the polyhedral convexity of the action
spaces is essential to the lower hemi-continuity of the ε-best reply correspondence and,
therefore, to any approach to the existence of ε-equilibria based on that property. The
importance of polyhedral convexity is strengthened here by showing that piecewise
polyhedral concavity of the players’ value functions implies i-upper semi-continuity.
This result is then used to show that Radzik’s Theorem is a corollary of the version
of Ziad’s theorem presented in Theorem 7.
Proposition 12 If Vi is piecewise polyhedral quasi-concave, then ui is i-upper semi-
continuous.
Proof. Let x−i ∈ X−i, {xk−i}∞k=1 ⊆ X−i be a sequence converging to x−i and
{αk}∞k=1 ⊆ (0, 1] converging to zero. Let x¯k−i = αkxk−i + (1− αk)x−i for all k ∈ N.
Let γ = lim supk Vi(x¯
k
−i). Then, there exists a subsequence {x¯kj−i}j of {x¯k−i}k such
that limj→∞ Vi(x¯
kj
−i) = γ. We may assume that x
kj
−i 6= x−i for infinitely many indexes
j, since otherwise x
kj
−i = x¯
kj
−i = x−i for all j sufficiently large and so lim supk Vi(x
k
−i) ≥
lim supj Vi(x
kj
−i) = Vi(x−i) = lim supk Vi(x¯
k
−i). Hence, taking a subsequence if neces-
sary, we may assume that x
kj
−i 6= x−i for all j ∈ N; clearly, this implies that x¯kj−i 6= x−i
for all j ∈ N. Let ε > 0 and let J1 ∈ N be such that Vi(x¯kj−i) > γ − ε for all j ≥ J1.
Let {X l−i}Lil=1 be a compact, convex cover of X−i such that Vi is polyhedral quasi-
concave on X l−i for all l = 1, . . . , Li. Since the cover is finite, we may assume that
there exists l ∈ {1, . . . , Li} such that x¯kj−i ∈ X l−i for all j ∈ N. Letting P = {y ∈
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X l−i : Vi(y) ≥ γ − ε}, then P is a polytope and x¯kj−i ∈ P for all j ≥ J1. Furthermore,
x−i ∈ P since P is compact.
By Lemma 9, there exist J > J1 and sequences {xˆkj−i}∞k=1 and {θkj}∞k=1 such that
xˆ
kj
−i ∈ P , θkj ∈ (0, 1) and xkj−i = θkj xˆkj−i+(1−θkj)x−i for all j ≥ J . Hence, for all j ≥ J ,
it follows that x
kj
−i ∈ P , which implies that Vi(xkj−i) ≥ γ − ε and so lim supk Vi(xk−i) ≥
γ− ε. Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, it follows that lim supk Vi(xk−i) ≥ γ = lim supk Vi(x¯k−i).
Thus, ui is i-upper semi-continuous.
We note that for two-player games on a square with piecewise quasi-concave payoff
functions, each player has a piecewise polyhedral quasi-concave value function and so
an i-upper semi-continuous payoff function. Indeed, since, for all i = 1, 2, both Xi
and X−i are contained in R, every convex, compact subset of Xi or X−i is a polytope.
In particular, Xi and X−i are polytopes, if {X l−i}Lil=1 is a compact, convex cover of
X−i, then X l−i is a polytope and so are the upper sets {x−i ∈ X l−i : Vi(x−i) ≥ a},
a ∈ R, of Vi in X l−i. Thus, combining this observation with Ziad’s theorem, we obtain
the main result in Radzik (1991).
Corollary 13 (Radzik) If G is a two-player game such that, for all i = 1, 2, (1)
Xi is a compact interval on the real line and (2) ui is upper semi-continuous and
piecewise quasi-concave, then G has an ε-equilibrium for all ε > 0.
We can also use Proposition 12 to obtain existence results for n-person games
played in polytopes that parallel the statement of Radzik’s Theorem and are, again,
a corollary of Ziad’s. One such result is Proposition 6, stated in the introduction
and reproduced in Corollary 14 below for convenience. Its statement parallels that
of Radzik in that action spaces are polytopes and payoff functions are upper semi-
continuous and piecewise quasi-concave, but it allows for more than two players and
for action spaces that are subsets of any euclidean space. Since in this setting players’
value functions are not necessarily piecewise polyhedral quasi-concave, this require-
ment must be made explicitly. A second existence result is then obtained by noting
that if players’ payoff functions are piecewise polyhedral quasi-concave, so are their
value functions (player i’s payoff function is piecewise polyhedral quasi-concave if there
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is a finite cover of X−i by compact convex subsets X l−i such that ui is polyhedral
quasi-concave on Xi ×X l−i for all l).
Corollary 14 If G is such that, for all i ∈ N , (1) Xi is a polytope, (2) ui is upper
semi-continuous and piecewise quasi-concave and (3) Vi is polyhedral piecewise quasi-
concave, then G has an ε-equilibrium for all ε > 0.
In particular, if G is such that, for all i ∈ N , (1) Xi is a polytope and (2) ui
is upper semi-continuous and piecewise polyhedral quasi-concave, then G has an ε-
equilibrium for all ε > 0.
4 Concluding Remarks
The approach for the existence results discussed in this note relies on the lower hemi-
continuity of the ε-best reply correspondence. As the example in Section 3 shows,
this condition may fail even if the game satisfies the assumptions in Ziad (1997).
Nevertheless, we have shown that this problem can be solved by assuming that players’
action spaces are polytopes. Furthermore, we show that if an upper semi-continuous
game is such that the upper sets of players’ payoff functions are polytopes (or at
least it satisfies a generalization of this condition), then it has an ε-equilibrium for
all ε > 0.
The drawback of this note is that it does not answer the question of whether or not
Ziad’s theorem holds as it was stated originally. For instance, it is clear that the game
presented in Section 2 has Nash equilibria. Moreover, so does the game presented at
the end of Section 2 and obtained by modifying the original example so that players’
payoff functions are not i-upper semi-continuous. In fact, one can conjecture that
every game with nonempty, compact, convex and finite-dimensional action spaces
and with upper semi-continuous and piecewise quasi-concave payoff functions have
ε-equilibria for all ε > 0.
Although no answer to the above conjecture will be offered, we note that the
problem can be simplified by reducing it to games with finite-valued payoff functions.
In fact, if G is a game satisfying the above properties, we can first normalize payoffs
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so that ui(X) ⊆ (0, 1) for all i ∈ N and then define, for all k ∈ N, uki (x) = (j−1)/2k if
(j−1)/2k ≤ ui(x) < j/2k, for all j = 0, . . . , 2k (so, uki (x) is defined by rounding down
ui(x) to the nearest multiple of 2
−k). Then, it is easy to see that for all i ∈ N and k ∈
N, uki is finite-valued, upper semi-continuous and piecewise quasi-concave and {uki }∞k=1
converges uniformly to ui. In fact, if a ∈ (0, 1) and j = min{j′ : (j′−1)/2k ≥ a}, then
{x ∈ Xi×Y−i : uki (x) ≥ a} = {x ∈ Xi×Y−i : ui(x) ≥ (j−1)/2k} is closed if Y−i = X−i
and convex if Y−i = X l−i (where {X l−i}l is a compact convex cover of X−i given by
the piecewise quasi-concavity of ui). Thus, u
k
i is upper semi-continuous and piecewise
quasi-concave. Furthermore, one has that supx∈X |uki (x)−ui(x)| ≤ 2−k implying that
{uki }∞k=1 converges uniformly to ui. We finally claim that if one establishes that every
game with finite-valued, upper semi-continuous and piecewise quasi-concave payoff
functions (whose action spaces also satisfy the same properties as those of G) have
a Nash equilibrium, then the properties of {uki }∞k=1, i ∈ N , imply that G has an
ε-equilibrium for all ε > 0. Indeed, if k ∈ N is such that supx∈X |uki (x)− ui(x)| < ε/2
for all i ∈ N , and x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of Gk = (Xi, uki )i∈N , then, for all i ∈ N
and xi ∈ Xi, ui(x∗) > uki (x∗)− ε/2 ≥ uki (xi, x∗−i)− ε/2 > ui(xi, x∗−i)− ε and so x∗ is
an ε-equilibrium of G.
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